I THE REFERRAL OF THE DUTCH COUNCIL OF STATE
A few preliminary remarks are in order to understand the wording of the referral. The Netherlands had not transposed Article 15-(c)QD when the Elfagajis applied for a residence permit. Two clauses of the domestic statute (the Law on aliens) applied. Under Article 29-1: " A residence permit for a fixed period…may be issued to an alien….b) who has proved that he has good grounds for believing that if he is expelled he will run a real risk of being subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment The obvious conclusion would have been that the transposition was indeed necessary. No referral was necessary on this point. - The two questions contained in the referral mention Article 3 ECHR and the Strasbourg Court case law relating to it. This is also strange, for two reasons: The first one is that the Elgafajis relied on Article 15(c) QD, not (b), which mentions torture. The second one is that under the consistent case law of the ECJ EU Directives and Regulations must be given an autonomous meaning and interpretation. The fact that the ECJ duly takes into account the case law of the European Court of Human Rights does not restrict the scope of this principle. The real question is contained in the second question asked by the Dutch Council of State -provided that one deletes from it the words " in comparison…protection ".
II THE SUBMISSIONS OF THE MEMBER STATES

AND OF THE COMMISSION
In addition to the Netherlands seven other Member States presented submissions: Belgium, Finland, France, Greece, Italy, Sweden and the UK. • The fundamental right guaranteed under Article 3 ECHR is part of the general principles of Community law, the observance of which is guaranteed by the Court.
• The latter takes into consideration the case law of the European Court of Human Rights in interpreting the scope of that right in the Community legal order.
• It is Article 15-(b) QD which corresponds to Article 3 ECHR. As to the interpretation of "individual threat" the judgment makes the following points:
• " By contrast " the harm defined in Article 15-(c) " covers a more general risk of harm 29 .
• The violence mentioned is an "indiscriminate one", " a term which implies that it may extend to people irrespective of their personal circumstances" 30 .
• 
III.3. An assessment of the ECJ's judgment
The following points must be emphasized. They have a direct relation with the task of domestic courts.
1. As to the burden of proof in general the Court held that " the existence of a serious and individual threat to the life and person of an applicant for subsidiary protection is not subject to the condition that that applicant adduces evidence that he is specifically targeted by reason of factors particular to his personal circumstances" 
